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Abstract
The paper addresses the role of education policies for institutional change.
We focus on two contrasting effects of education and human capital accumula-
tion. On the one side, education prompts economic growth and increases the
wealth managed by an autocratic elite. On the other side, education increases the
"awareness" of citizens (capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and
their labor-market aspirations) and requires the elite to devote more resources
to income redistribution. Along the lines of this trade-off, our theory provides
a Lipsetian explanation of the positive relationship between education and insti-
tutional change, the positive relationship between development and institutional
change, and the negative relationship between inequality and institutional change.
Furthermore, we obtain new insights on the natural resources curse hypothesis and
on the design of development aid programs.
Keywords: Democratization; Human capital; Lipset’s theory; Natural resource
curse.
JEL Classification: D72; I25; O11; O43.
∗Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS and EHESS, and Institute
for Advanced Studies (IMéRa).
†Department of Economics, University of Oslo. Corresponding author. Email: pgpiacqua-
dio@econ.uio.no.
‡INRA-LAMETA and University of Montpellier I. Email: prieur@supagro.inra.fr.
1
1 Introduction
Whether education is a prerequisite of democratization or one of its side products is an
unsettled question in both political sciences and economics. Perhaps the most influential
contemporaneous work on this theme is due to Lipset (1960). According to Lipset,
democracy requires a significant civic engagement, a political culture of negotiation,
and the recognition of the need for compromises. As these values are typical of educated
people, he concludes that education is more compatible with democracies.
A broader connected debate is the origin and evolution of institutions.The viewpoint
that socio-economic development is conducive to democratization, commonly known as
“modernization theory,” is another major contribution of Lipset (1960). An alternative
viewpoint has been recently advanced by Acemoglu et al. (2001), who put forward the
colonial origins of institutions. Their message is that institutions are the ultimate cause
of development, and not the reverse (see also Rodrik et al., 2004). Glaeser et al. (2004)
dispute their result and conclude that “human capital is a more basic source of growth
than are institutions,” in line with the Lipsetian view and the earlier results by Barro
(1999). They argue that the typical institutional indicators considered by Acemoglu et
al. have a serious problem: they rather capture volatile outcomes than durable norms
(as should proxys for institutions do).1 While the econometric debate is still undecided
(see, among others, Acemoglu et al., 2005; Castello-Climent, 2008; and Przworski et
al., 2000), it’s fair to say that the Lipsetian theory of democratization is up to now a
valid and powerful framework for the analysis of institutional transformations. It’s for
example essential to understand the divergent economic patterns of North and South
Korea, which have been part of the same country until the early 1950s (see details of
the argument in Glaeser et al., 2004).
In contrast to the abundant empirical literature, there are only few attempts to cap-
ture the Lipsetian view in a theoretical framework. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)
introduce an endogenous political economy decision mechanism that depends on the
education of citizens: the ruling oligarchs set the education policy anticipating their
effects on the economic growth, on inequality, on the political participation of citizens,
and on the structure of political power. They show that a high initial per capita in-
come is associated with a larger likelihood of a country to be in a democracy and to
a quicker transition; initial inequality has, instead, the opposite effects. On a similar
1For example, certain popular measures of constraints on governments are shown to be twice as
volatile (in terms of average within country deviations) as Barro’s measure of years of schooling.
2
line, Glaeser et al. (2007) convey the idea that education raises the benefits of civic en-
gagement pretty much as social capital, therefore leading to a larger social and political
involvement. They further argue that education does not only favor the emergence of
democracy, but also helps stabilizing it. More recently, other aspects of Lipset theory
are being the object of theoretical developments. For example, Jung and Sunde (2014)
have investigated the Lipset claim that democracy is more likely in countries with more
equal distributions of resources.
In this paper, we develop a model of institutional change that allows us to explore
simultaneously the three essential features of Lipset’s theory: the link between educa-
tion and democracy; the link between economic development and democracy; and the
link between inequality and democracy. In this sense, our theory is a more compre-
hensive exploration of the implications of the Lipsetian thought. Concretely, we study
the paradigmatic case of an autocratic elite with full political and economic power. In
line with the recent literature on democratization games (see Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006), the elite anticipate the existence and extent of revolutionary threats. They can
act to avoid revolutions in two ways. They can either introduce an appropriate redis-
tribution policy and, thus, placate the incentives to revolt of the citizens. Or, they can
start the democratization process and dismiss their power.
Citizens are hand-to-mouth workers: they are employed in the national industry
and consume in each period their labor income and transfers. Should their consumption
not reach a specific threshold, workers would revolt. This threshold is endogenous in
the model and depends on their level of human capital. The idea is that as citizens
become more educated, they also become more aware of the political situation (see
Zaller, 1992) and they tend to be more politically sophisticated (see Luskin, 1990, and
Neuman, 1986). Moreover, as suggested by Campante and Chor (2012) to explain
the Arab Spring events, they also have higher income expectations and require better
working opportunities.2 Consequently, the education policy set by the elite has two
opposite effects. On the one side, human capital is a production factor in the economy,
so education enhances labor productivity and triggers economic growth. On the other
side, human capital accumulation has the above-described “awareness” cost, making
workers more demanding and possibly leading to the disruption of the incumbent elite.
2Education is certainly more multifaceted than what economists generally assume. As argued
by Chomsky (1996), education can be paradoxically used to obtain “ignorance,” with the aim of
standardization and domination of populations. This view is supported empirically by Castello-Climent
and Mukhopadhyay (2013). For the sake of tractability, we abstract from non-monotonic effects of
education on peoples desire for freedom.
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The latter effect has been already put forward by several authors to explain the lack
of support for mass education and/or its late set-up in England (see Galor and Moav
on the 1870 Forster act, 2006), in India (see Pal and Ghosh, 2012, on the role of the
landed elite against investment in basic education), or in Southern US (see Ager, 2013,
on the planters elite’s lack of support for mass schooling in the nineteenth century).
A major distinctive feature of our model is the resource-dependence of the econ-
omy under scrutiny, which fits a largely significant number of autocratic regimes in the
world. We assume that the economic power of the elite originates from a windfall of
resources (natural resources or other). The elite can either export such resources on
the international market or supply them to the national industry. In the first case, the
revenues from export can be directly allocated for their own benefit or for redistribution
and education policies. In the second case, the supply of resources to the national in-
dustry provides the elite with a further instrument to control citizens: by manipulating
the supply of resources, they can influence the relative scarcity of citizens’ labor and,
consequently, also their wage.
Our theory predicts two possible scenarios. A particularly painful post-dictatorship
period would not encourage the Lipsetian elite to democratize the country: they would
decide to keep investment in education low, rely massively on resource export, and
redistribute to citizens just enough to prevent any revolution. More surprisingly, a
Lipsetian elite—despite their full political and economic power—might undertake a path
leading to an institutional change in a finite time horizon. This path is characterized
by high investment in education, a progressive reduction of the dependence on resource
export, increasing claims of citizens, reducing inequality, and, eventually, a voluntary
power dismissal by the elite.
These predictions match well the Lipsetian traits of institutional change. The de-
mocratization path is triggered by the correct balance between economic returns to
citizens’ education and their increasing claims to consumption. Thus, a high level of
human capital is both a prerequisite and a consequence of institutional change: it is a
prerequisite as the elite would dismiss their power only if the economy is rich enough
to guarantee sufficient economic returns; it is a consequence as the elite anticipates the
costs and benefits of the democratization path and optimally decides to reach such hu-
man capital level at the cost of their political power. This provides a new explanation
of the Lipsetian link between education and democratization. More mechanically, the
Lipsetian link between economic development and democratization builds on education
being the engine of growth. The Lipsetian link between inequality and democratization
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follows from the citizens becoming more aware and demanding as their human capital
increases.
Relation to the literature
With respect to the existing scarce economic theory literature on Lipset’s theory
cited above (in particular, Bourguignon and Verdier, 2002, and Glaeser et al., 2007),
three main differences should be highlighted. First, by attributing full political and
economic power to the Lipsetian elite, we further emphasize how powerful education
policies can be for institutional change. Second, by eliminating the possibility of unan-
ticipated and violent revolutions—as well as the corresponding institutional changes—
our setting is more likely to capture those institutional changes that lead to stable
democracies; confirming, from a different perspective, the results by Glaeser et al.
(2007). Third and quite importantly, the presence of resources enriches the model with
a further dimension. Our comparative statics with respect to windfall resources are con-
sistent with Lipset’s theory, stating that higher incomes are favorable for democracy: in
our model, a larger amount of resources endows the elite with the necessary wealth to
take the path of workers’ education and guarantees a sufficient long-run payoff, despite
this is associated with an institutional change. Beyond making democratization more
likely, a larger amount of resources also leads to a shorter duration of the authoritarian
regime.
Moreover, the windfall of resources allows us to compare our predictions with game-
theoretic models of institutional change or of natural resources-induced conflicts. Our
conclusions are in line with those obtained within the former stream of literature where
dictatorships are ended through revolutions and not voluntarily as in our model. In
particular, the idea that the initial wealth of a country leads to earlier conflicts has
also been put forward also by Boucekkine et al. (2014). This result seems at odds with
the resource curse hypothesis, according to which resource abundance may undermine
the democratization process. However, the resource curse hypothesis receives only a
moderate empirical support: some economist argue that resource wealth strengthens
autocratic regimes (see among others, Ross 2001, and Tsui, 2011); others find no evi-
dence of a positive relationship between resource wealth and the stability of autocratic
regimes (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009, and Haber and Menaldo, 2011). The new mech-
anism presented in this paper—through the investment in education and the develop-
ment of citizens’ aspiration for democracy—can rationalize these contrasting opinions:
resource windfalls cannot alone trigger the democratization process. This also explains
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why in certain countries with large endowment in natural resources, investment in edu-
cation is particularly weak (see Gylfason, 2001). In our setting, even though a country
has a given large level of windfall rents, human capital accumulation (and therefore
democratization) is suboptimal at least in two cases: when the effectiveness of educa-
tion investment is not large enough and/or when the share of wealth accruing to the
elite after democratization is not large enough. Finally, our work can be related to the
broader debate on the effectiveness of large aid programs to poor countries (see Kraay
and Raddatz, 2007). Our theory predicts that even massive education policies devoted
to improve access to schools may not trigger sustainable development, nor can they
promote democratization. Indeed, their effectiveness is merely a matter of whether
they pursue the correct target, which according to our analysis is the quality of the
schooling system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of the economy. Section 3 studies in details the elite maximization problem. Section
4 and 5 study all the possible solutions and then compare them to determine the
optimal choices. Implications of the model are discussed in Section 6 whereas Section
7 concludes. All the proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 The model
Time is continuous, let t ∈ [0,∞). For notational simplicity, the time index is omitted
when there is no risk of confusion. In each period, the elite manage a constant windfall of
natural resources R > 0. Resources have two possible uses: a part of it can be exported
on the international primary good market –let the exported quantity be denoted by X–
and for the remaining part, it can be supplied internally to the manufacturing sector
–let this quantity be denoted by Q ≤ R −X. The international price of the resources
is constant over time and is denoted px > 0.
National firms operate in a competitive environment and produce a homogeneous
commodity Y using two inputs: resources Q and human capital H. With a Cobb-
Douglas specification Y = F (Q,H) = AQαH1−α, resource price and wage (per unit of
human capital) are:
p = α
Y
Q
(1)
and
w = (1− α) Y
H
. (2)
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The resource rent of the elite, obtained from export X and national supply Q, is
allocated between the elite’s consumption C, transfers to workers Θ, and education
investment E:
pxX + pQ ≥ C + Θ + E. (3)
Investment in the education sector increases human capital according to the follow-
ing accumulation function:
H˙ = h (E,H) = hE − δH (4)
where h > 0 measures the effectiveness of the education investment and δ ≥ 0 is the
depreciation rate of human capital.
In each period, a unitary mass of workers –or citizens– inelastically supply their
human capital H to national firms and earn an equilibrium wage w, determined by (2).
Their income is completed by the transfers Θ and is entirely consumed in each period.
If workers find their consumption not large enough, they can decide to contest the
power of the elite. The threshold consumption that triggers a revolt is given by the
sum of a subsistence consumption—let s > 0 denote such level—and an awareness
component, which depends on their human capital level. The important point is that
this threshold is endogenous. As outlined in the introduction, this conveys the idea
that as workers get more and more educated, they become more aware of the politi-
cal situation in the country, they become more politically sophisticated, require better
working opportunities, and have higher claims for democracy. As a result, they would
not revolt only if their consumption were sufficiently large. Let the “awareness” com-
ponent of consumption be linear in human capital, with political awareness parameter
(the multiplier of human capital) φ > 0. Then, workers decision to revolt at each t is:revolt if wH + Θ < s+ φHno revolt otherwise (5)
We assume that a revolt, if any, leads to a more democratic regime. In this situation,
workers represent a permanent threat to the elite. However, a key aspect of our model
is the capacity of the elite to fully internalize their incentives to revolt. This capacity
manifests itself in the additional – no revolt – constraint (5) faced by the elite who
will ultimately be the ones to decide whether or not to instigate the democratization
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process.
Let T ∈ R+
⋃ {∞} be the time at which the autocratic regime comes to an end
(permanent dictatorship holds when T = ∞). This is a control variable in the hands
of the elite. The decision to democratize is based on their situation in the regime
following the institutional change. A sharing rule is then used to describe how the
wealth of the economy is distributed to agents at T ; in particular, since wealth is an
increasing function of human capital, we shall assume that the elite expect a factor
pi > 0 of the amount of human capital at T . As explained in the introduction, such
an assumption may also be interpreted as a Lipsetian trait: human capital is tightly
connected with negotiation and absence of violence in Lipset’s theory; thus, a scrap
value function increasing with human capital is a natural way to summarize what is
going on in the second regime. Indeed, Elite highly regard the possibility of leaving the
power without being exposed to full expropriation and political violence. The larger
parameter pi, the larger this impact of human capital on the post-autocratic regime is
valued by the elite. An alternative explanation is that the elite expects to control (some
part of the) resources also after democratization and, given some complementarity, their
value will depend on human capital.
The intertemporal well-being of the elite is given by:
U e =
ˆ T
0
e−ρtu (C) dt+ e−ρTpiHT (6)
where the instantaneous utility function is u (C) ≡ (C)1−γ
1−γ with γ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ > 0 is
the discount rate.3
Before moving to the analysis, it is worth mentioning three final points.
First, the elite are particularly powerful. They are able to control the consump-
tion/income of workers, and thus their willingness to revolt, in three different ways:
(i) directly, by setting the transfer Θ; (ii) indirectly, by deciding how many resources
to supply to the national industry Q; and (iii) dynamically, by investing more or less
in education E and thus setting their level of human capital. Furthermore, they con-
trol the political transition process and choose the timing T (possibly infinite) for the
3The assumption that the elasticity of consumption be positive ensures that the utility is positive
for any value of consumption. This is needed for the continuation payoff at the time of institutional
change, i.e. piHT ≥ 0, to be intrapersonal comparable. When instead γ > 1, utility levels are strictly
negative and an immediate institutional change (independently of the human capital level) is always
optimal.
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institutional change.
Second, we shall assume that the resource windfall is sufficiently large so that it is
possible to sustain a dictatorial regime when human capital is zero.
Assumption 1. pxR > s: The value of resources is larger than the subsistence con-
sumption of the workers and gives the elite some freedom in how to allocate such wealth.
Third, an alternative approach would have been to (i) explicitly model the features
of the economy following the institutional change, (ii) solve the corresponding opti-
mization problem, and (iii) retrieve the resulting value function and use it as a scrap
value. Proceeding like this is both interesting and feasible (simply see the second regime
problem – with no more distinction between the elite and the workers – as an optimal
growth problem) but rises a number of additional issues (related to the two groups’
respective size in the first regime etc.). Besides, it would make the optimality analysis
really tricky without changing much the results.
3 The elite maximization problem
The elite seek to maximize utility (6), subject to the budget constraint (3), equilibrium
prices (1) and (2), the revolution decisions of workers (5), and the dynamics of human
capital (4). The decision variables are the use of resources Q, own consumption C,
transfers Θ, and education E. Substituting Θ from the non-revolt condition of workers
(5), the optimization problem of the elite can be written as an optimal stopping problem,
where T is the time until which the constraint is met. Formally:
max
{Q,E,T}
ˆ T
0
e−ρtu
(
px (R−Q) + AQαH1−α − E − s− φH) dt+ e−ρTpiH(T )
s.t. 
H˙ = hE − δH
H(T ) = HT is free
E ≥ 0
with H(0) = H0 given
Maximizing the criterion with respect to national resource supply Q, requires that
national prices equalize international ones, i.e. p = px, and sets the optimal ratio
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between resources and human capital as follows:4
Q
H
=
(
αA
px
) 1
1−α
(7)
Let λ be the costate variable associated with human capital. Its equilibrium dy-
namics is:
λ˙ = (δ + ρ)λ− C−γ
(
(1− α)A
(
Q
H
)α
− φ
)
(8)
At the equilibrium, optimal investment in education is such that the marginal benefit
from education equals the marginal cost of investing in education (in terms of fore-
gone consumption). Let µ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the positivity
constraint on education, this yields the optimal consumption of the elite:
C = (λh+ µ)−
1
γ (9)
The slackness conditions on education investment E require:
µ ≥ 0 and µE = 0 (10)
The optimal time T <∞ for violating the no-revolt condition and inducing a regime
change is such that the current value of the Lagrangian be equal to the value of the
salvage function; i.e.:
u (C(T )) + λ [hE(T )− δH(T )] = ρpiH(T ) (11)
Finally, the transversality condition requires that:
λ(T ) =
∂S (H)
∂H
|H=H(T ) = pi (12)
Convexity of the problem with respect to optimal education investment E and internally
supplied resources Q guarantees that the corresponding second order conditions are
4The optimal resource supply of the elite to the national industry would determine a price wedge
between international and internal resource prices in case of costly redistributive transfers. In this case,
the elite would find it more profitable to redistribute income to workers by oversupplying resources and,
indirectly, determining a wage increase. While this extension is potentially relevant for an empirical
assessment, the results discussed are not affected.
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always satisfied. The second order conditions for the optimal stopping problem are not
necessarily met and will be discussed in more details in the following.
We solve the model in three steps: we first study the dynamics of the system
when education investments are strictly positive; we then study the case of either zero
investments in education or alternating periods of positive and zero investments; and
finally we characterize optimality by combining the results.
4 Optimality candidates
4.1 Education-driven institutional change
Define the instantaneous returns on human capital Ω and the instantaneous return on
education investment χ as follows:
Ω ≡ 1−α
α
px
(
αA
px
) 1
1−α − φ,
χ ≡ hΩ− δ,
Instantaneous returns on human capital are defined as the difference between a gross re-
turn and the feedback effect exerted by human capital on workers’ claims for democracy,
which is represented by the political awareness parameter, φ.
Straightforward manipulation of the necessary optimality conditions yields the gen-
eral solution, valid for any solution with strictly positive education E > 0 (the super-
script 1 indicates this regime):
C1(t) = C10e
(χ−ρ)t
γ
H1(t) =
(
H0 +
h(pxR−s)
χ
− γhC10
ρ−χ(1−γ)
)
eχt +
γhC10
ρ−χ(1−γ)e
(χ−ρ)t
γ − h(pxR−s)
χ
λ1(t) =
(C10)
−γ
h
e(ρ−χ)t
(13)
Then, we can establish that:
Proposition 1. (i) There is no solution combining permanent dictatorship and pos-
itive education.
(ii) There may be a solution combining institutional change and positive education.
(a) This solution is characterized by an increasing stock of human capital, an
institutional change in finite time T = T (H0, R, pi), and a corresponding
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end-point stock of human capital:
HT =
h
ρ− χ
(
γ(hpi)−
1
γ
1− γ + p
xR− s
)
> 0. (14)
(b) Necessary conditions for the existence of such solution for all H0 ∈ [0, HT ]
are: {
ρ > χ
pxR− s > (hpi)− 1γ . (15)
(c) Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique solution are (15) and χ >
χ, with χ ∈ (0, ρ) the unique solution of:
e
γχ
ρ−χ =
ρ[(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ)) + γ2χ]
(1− γ)(ρ− χ)2 . (16)
The condition ρ > χ sets an upper bound on the instantaneous returns to human
capital and is a necessary condition for the existence of a solution with education-driven
institutional change. Under the opposite condition χ ≥ ρ, autocracy is too growth-
friendly. The elite can invest in education and, due to the high returns, this stimulates
growth of output (and citizens’ consumption) while being compatible with the respect of
the no-revolution constraint, which is in fact never binding. However, the solution with
permanent dictatorship and positive education is not relevant because it would either
violate the resource constraint, or imply resource imports to become infinite (with X
tending to −∞). The second necessary existence condition in (15) states that resource
windfalls net of the intrinsic subsistence consumption level should be larger than the
level of consumption the elite just enjoy at the date dictatorship ceases, C1(T ). Finally,
a sufficient condition for existence requires that the returns to human capital be higher
than a threshold χ, defined by (16). High enough returns to human capital logically
guarantees that it is worthwhile for the elite to engage in the path of education and
sustained capital accumulation.
Under ρ > χ, the time path of consumption is decreasing whereas the stock of human
capital is increasing. The intuition runs as follows. For the elite to find it optimal to
democratize they should be able to accumulate a sufficient amount of human capital,
which will directly affect the wealth they will hold in the post-dictatorship regime,
and will also guarantee that they can enjoy their wealth in a peaceful environment.
Thus investment in human capital should be favored over consumption. Moreover, by
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investing a lot in human capital, the elite foster the development of citizens’ claims
for a freer system through the increasing awareness mechanism. In order to delay the
political regime change the elite have no other option but to transfer a lot of resources
to the citizens. This also comes at the expense of their own consumption.
Note that under the conditions of Proposition 1, solutions that combine positive
education and a revolution in finite time exist for any H0 ≤ HT . In other words,
the stated conditions guarantee the existence of a solution with education-driven in-
stitutional change independently of the initial endowment in human capital. This is a
reasonable feature of our model: it would otherwise be difficult to explain why some
countries are doomed to dictatorial regimes exclusively based on their initial stock of
human capital and would also raise the issue of identifying this initial period (of the
development process). Importantly, this doesn’t mean that the initial stock of human
capital is irrelevant to our analysis. As far as the optimality analysis is concerned,
one expects that this variable will be crucial to determine which one of the optimality
candidates yields the optimum.
The results stated in Proposition 1 also give a first insight into the predictions of
our model concerning the Lipsetian links between human capital and democracy, and
between resources and democracy. An obvious implication of the proposition is the
incompatibility between permanent dictatorship and education (i), which is in accor-
dance with Lipset’s theory. The reason of this incompatibility follows from the no-revolt
constraint: it’s impossible to satisfy this constraint with a positive level of education in-
vestment as the consumption aspirations associated with positive education will end up
exceeding the redistribution capacities of the elite. In addition, it is worth emphasizing
some other interesting features of the first optimality candidates. They are summarized
in the next two corollaries.
Corollary 1. The solution with education-driven institutional change is possible only
if, ceteris paribus,
(i) Resource wealth, pxR, is large enough.
(ii) Elite’s incentives to democratize, that are provided by the share of wealth accruing
to the elite after they give up power, pi, are important enough.
(iii) The effectiveness of the education, h, needs to be important enough too. But, in
contrast to resource wealth and the sharing rule, it should not take an excessive
value since the instantaneous returns to education, χ, cannot be too high.
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These properties are in line with Lipset’s theory in two essential aspects, the link
between democratization and education and the link between resources (or income) and
democratization.5 First of all, the model predicts that a large amount of resources (or
of their export price) is a precondition for the emergence of a non-dictatorial regime
through human capital accumulation. However, the resource wealth of a country (mea-
sured by pxR) is not the unique relevant determinant of democratization. Two further
factors enter the necessary conditions for the emergence of a democratization path: a
sufficient return to investment in education, h, and a sufficient reward for the elite at the
time of institutional change, pi. Democratization may not occur under large resource
revenues because one of the two latter parameters is too small (leading to violating
conditions (15)). Importantly, the interaction between the resource wealth and these
factors is likely to be responsible for the mixed support for the natural resource curse
hypothesis (see the debate opposing proponents of this hypothesis, Ross, 2001, and
Tsui, 2011, and detractors, Alexeev and Conrad, 2009, and Haber and Menaldo, 2011)
and is in line with the empirical studies pointing at the mis-management of education
in several oil-exporting countries (see Gylfason, 2001). Finally, notice that the role of
the return to education is tricky: it should be high enough ceteris paribus for democ-
ratization via education to arise but it should not be too high as the induced wealth
in the hands of the elite in such a case could be sufficient to compensate for the larger
awareness of the workers. In this case, a developing dictatorship could be sustained,
although no equilibrium paths exist (see the interpretation of (15)).
Beyond the existence of a solution with institutional change, it is also useful to stress
how the time-to-democratization is affected by the parameters of the model (see the
comparative statics exercise at the end of Appendix A.1).
Corollary 2. The optimal time for institutional change, T = T (H0, R, pi), is decreas-
ing in both the initial endowment in human capital, H0, the constant flow of resource
windfall, R, and the sharing rule, pi.
The first two features strengthen the correlation between wealth and democratiza-
tion discussed before. The larger is the initial stock of human capital (another possible
measure of human wealth) or the windfall of resources, the quicker are the Lipsetian
elite in driving the country into an institutional change. While the larger windfall is
5Note that they are a direct consequence of the second necessary condition in (15). Also note that
the parameters R and pi do not show up in the sufficient condition χ > χ since they don’t enter into
the expressions of Ω. In contrast, the parameters h and px enter this condition through Ω.
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also associated to a larger level of human capital at the time of institutional change,
such an effect is absent for the initial human capital level. Finally, the optimal time-to-
democratization is decreasing in pi. The elite compensates a less favorable sharing rule
by increasing the human capital of the country at the institutional change, HT . This
requires a longer period of investment in education.
To end up this discussion, it is important to measure the elite’s payoff associated with
the solution with education-driven institutional change. Let such optimality candidate
be referred to as regime 1; then the present value (for the elite) of following this regime
is given by (hereafter, the optimal time for institutional change is expressed in terms
of H0 only):
V 1(H0) = e
−ρT (H0)
(
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ))(e
(ρ−χ(1−γ)T (H0)
γ − 1) + piHT
)
.
The typical dynamics corresponding to this first possible solution is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Phase diagram.
In the next section the other optimality candidates are briefly reviewed.
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4.2 No-education and permanent dictatorship
The general solution corresponding to no investments in education, i.e. E = 0, is given
by (the superscript 2 refers to the regime with no education):
H2(t) = He−δt
C2(t) = pxR− s+ ΩH2(t)
λ2(t) = e(ρ+δ)t
(
L− ´ ΩC2(u)−γe−(ρ+δ)udu)
with H,L two constants to be determined. It can easily be shown that:
Proposition 2. (i) There always exists a solution combining permanent dictatorship
with no investment in education.
(ii) There may be a solution alternating periods of investment in education with periods
of no investment, but these never provide a candidate for optimality.
The solution with permanent dictatorship and no education is characterized by a
decreasing flow of consumption and a decreasing stock of human capital. Consumption
asymptotically converges toward C2(∞) = pxR − s, while the stock of human capital
vanishes. This is the path taken by the elite that attach greatest importance to being
in power and prefer not to invest in human capital in order to avoid the risk of being
overthrown. Solutions with no education exist for any level of the stock of human
capital; whereas, solutions featuring a regime change from positive to zero education
can be disregarded because their are always dominated by the former type, i.e., they
are associated with lower present values (see Appendix A.2).
At this stage of the analysis, we are left with two optimality candidates, which makes
the options available to the elite very clear. Either they choose to rely on resource wealth
and not to invest in education in order to keep the labor force uneducated and docile.
But this requires to sacrifice education-driven economic growth. Or, the elite engage
in a policy of sustained investment in education, which promotes the accumulation of
human capital at the cost of giving up political power in finite time because of the
development of citizens’ claims for democracy. As expected, variables like the returns
to education (and human capital), the initial stock of human capital, the discount rate
but also the share of wealth accruing to the elite after a revolution will play a central
role in explaining what is the elite’s best option.
For the remainder of the analysis, it is useful to retrieve the value function corre-
sponding to the optimality candidate with no education. The present value is given
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by:
V 2(H0) =
ˆ ∞
0
1
1− γ
(
pxR− s+ ΩH0e−δt
)1−γ
e−ρtdt.
Before determining the optimal choice of the elite, we compare regime 1 and 2 in
terms of their implications for the link between inequalities and institutional change.
4.3 Inequality implications of a Lipsetian elite
So far, we have addressed the links income-institutional change and human capital-
institutional change. In this respect, we have shown that the predictions of the model
are consistent with Lipset’s theory. It remains to study the link inequalities-institutional
change.
As workers are a homogeneous mass of individuals, the only way to appraise in-
equalities in a direct and elementary way is by tracking the consumption of the elite vs.
the consumption of workers. Although this is not completely in the spirit of Lipset’s
theory concerning this aspect (see Jung and Sunde, 2014, for a tighter connection),
this exercise turns out to be worthwhile. Recall that the workers’ income is entirely
devoted to consumption. At any solution, we have CiW (t) = s+φH i(t) for i = 1, 2. Let
I i(t) ≡ CiW (t)
Ci(t)
be the index of inequalities at solution i = 1, 2. Then, we can establish
the following result.
Proposition 3. At the solution with education-driven institutional change, inequalities
continuously shrink. At the solution with permanent dictatorship and no investment in
education, the opposite result holds if:
R >
(1− α)s
φα
(
αA
px
) 1
1−α
. (17)
A couple of comments are in order here. First, we observe that along the transition
process to non-dictatorship, inequalities do decrease. It is as if in order to prepare
the ground for a democratic regime, the elite have to progressively reduce the income
(consumption) gap between the two groups until the institutional change. Intuitively,
since the elite invest in human capital along this path, growth is stimulated. But the
positive growth effect is dominated by the negative effect due to increasing awareness
and the elite have no option but to sacrifice part of their consumption to satisfy the
no-revolt constraint and delay the date of leaving office. Second and not surprisingly,
permanent dictatorship imply a widening of inequalities if resource windfalls are high,
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the awareness cost is large, the international resource price is high, and the level of
subsistence consumption is low. Under these conditions, the dictator is able to fill
the revolt constraint at least cost. By not investing in human capital, the people are
maintained under control while the elite become richer and richer relative to the workers.
The next section investigates the optimality of the above-identified solutions.
5 Optimal solution
The optimality analysis boils down to a study of the relative performance of the solution
with education-driven institutional change vs. the solution with permanent dictatorship
and no-education. To conduct this analysis, we proceed to a comparison of the present
values associated with our two optimality candidates. The results can be summarized
as follows:
Proposition 4. Let H0 ∈ [0, HT ]. The following cases can arise:
(i) The solution with permanent dictatorship and no-education is optimal for all H0
iff V 2 (HT ) > V 1 (HT );
(ii) The solution with education-driven institutional change is optimal for all H0 iff
V 1 (0) > V 2 (0);
(iii) Otherwise, a human capital poverty trap arises. There exists H¯ ∈ [0, HT ] such
that the solution with education-driven institutional change is optimal iff H0 ≥ H¯.
Both the no-education regime with persistent dictatorship and the education regime
with democratization can arise. Depending on the parameters, it might be possible that:
(i) the first alternative is chosen independently of the initial stock of human capital;
(ii) the second alternative is chosen independently of the initial stock of human capital;
and (iii) the regime choice depends on the initial human capital stock, a low stock is
associated to no-education investment and infinite horizon dictatorship while a large
stock is associated to education investment and democratization in finite time.
This result sheds light on the relationship between education, development, and
democratization. First, education is necessary for both development and democratiza-
tion: it is the engine of economic growth and, by increasing the workers awareness, it
is also responsible for the institutional change. Second, education investments might
be optimal for the ruling elite, despite it might lead to more democratic institutions,
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as their political power gets substituted by economic returns. Third, the existence of
a poverty trap is particularly interesting for it teaches that development aid leading to
“small” increases in human capital might not be sufficient for a regime switch and thus
fails to have permanent effects on development and institutions of the recipient country.
The next result further emphasizes the conditions under which the elite find the
democratization path optimal.
Proposition 5. The solution with education-driven institutional change is optimal for
all H0 ∈ [0, HT ] if:
pxR− s > e γ1+γ (hpi)− 1γ . (18)
This sufficient condition can easily be interpreted once one observes that it is a
stronger version of the second necessary existence condition (15). It confirms the pre-
vious intuition about which factors are crucial for the decision of a Lipsetian elite to
educate the population and drive the country out of autocracy. Indeed, Proposition 5
illustrates that institutional change initiated by the Lipsetian elite is a matter of having
the right conditions. A large stock of resources might not trigger education policies and
democratization if the education sector doesn’t ensure good enough economic returns
to the elite. A permanent positive shock to international resource prices might give the
elite the wealth needed to invest in education and human capital accumulation, but
this opportunity will not be taken if the wealth prospects at the time of institutional
change are not sufficiently compelling.
Now assume that condition (18) doesn’t hold but a path with democratization re-
mains an optimality candidate (conditions (15) are met). Would the elite still find it
optimal to democratize? The answer is yes, provided the initial human capital H0 is
high enough, consistently with Proposition 4, item (iii). In such a situation, democrati-
zation cannot be optimal for any initial level of human capital, and poverty traps may
be the optimal outcomes for the least endowed countries. It’s possible to establish the
following sufficient condition result.
Proposition 6. Assume δ = 0. Then, the solution with education-driven institutional
change is optimal for a high enough initial resource stock if:
pxR− s > (hpi)
− 1
γ
ρ(1− γ)((ρ− χ)(1− γ)e
γ
1+γ − χγ). (19)
The proof is algebraically cumbersome as it consists in comparing the stream of value
functions attainable in each institutional regime for any initial level of human capital.
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The condition δ = 0 is a simplification that allows us to get an explicit sufficient con-
dition, comparable to those generated along the text. The sufficient condition (19) is
weaker than condition (18). At first glance, however, the right hand side of (19) looks
more complex than the corresponding side of (18) as new terms show up: the discount
rate ρ and the return on education investment χ. However, one can straightforwardly
check that the right hand side of (19) is increasing in ρ and converges exactly to the
right hand side of (18) when ρ goes to infinity. Not surprisingly, the larger the discount
rate, the lower the incentives to save and invest, and the less likely is democratization:
larger discount rates make it more difficult to satisfy the sufficient condition for de-
mocratization (19). The latter also tells us that if the fundamentals of the economy
are not too bad –the resource windfall, the return on education, and the elite’s share
parameters– and if the initial human capital is not too low, there may exist an optimal
path to democratization via education.
6 Implications for development policies
In terms of aid policy, our model delivers some interesting mixed recommendations. We
believe they are specially interesting because our institutional set-up, while simplistic,
covers the case of many autocracies in the South. In first place, our setting implies
that aid policy in support for education, even if massive, may not be always effective
in fostering economic growth and/or democratization. Even tough a massive aid policy
of education systems can temporarily increase human capital (when improving access
to education and therefore raising the enrollment rates), it may not have a permanent
positive effect either because the efficiency of local education systems is hard to improve
(that’s parameter h cannot be raised above a minimal level), or more seriously, because
the institutional conditions are not good enough (here for example, pi should be big
enough). This is consistent with the view questioning the efficiency of large aid to the
poorest countries (see Kraay and Raddatz, 2007, for example).
Of course, aid programs may (and should) target education efficiency, especially in
the situation where the economy is poor (low windfall revenue in our theory). Our
model produces a clear hierarchy in this respect: if education efficiency (our parameter
h) is above a certain threshold value for education, development and democratization
will turn optimal ceteris paribus irrespective of the initial value of capital (H0) and even
though the country is run by an autocratic regime (as one can infer from Proposition
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5). Therefore our model suggests an immediate way to settle the traditional tradeoff
between expanding school enrollments versus improving school quality faced by devel-
opment agencies. Again this is consistent with the view expressed by many development
economists from the 80s. For example, Fuller (1986) already noted that “...school qual-
ity (indicated by per pupil expenditures) has suffered most in those developing countries
which have expanded enrollments rapidly in the past decade. No progress in improv-
ing school quality is evident in-the poorest developing countries since 1970. The gap
in school quality between low-income and middle-income Third World countries also
has widened during this period.” The situation is not that improved in the current
century. While primary school enrollment has increased from 59 percent to 77 percent
in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, education experts still point at very low
learning figures as reflected for example in the Africa Learning Barometer.6 Of course,
a development agency cannot have full control of school quality in developing countries
as the notion of education quality itself is connected to a bulk of determinants and cir-
cumstances in these countries. It’s far from a pure statistical debate (see Hanushek et
al. 2007, for a quick view of this type of debate): the efficiency of the education sector
in these countries does depend on various factors which are not all directly related to
the se! ctor, say to the quality of the teachers or of the education infrastructures. These
external factors range from those affecting the learning capacity of children (like health
and nutrition, see Strauss and Thomas, 1998) to institutional and political factors, some
related to the story told in our paper as a better education is likely to stimulate de-
cisively political awareness, not speaking about the so-called dictatorship in education
where the education system is used by the autocracies to annihilate the critical skills of
the individuals (see again Chomsky, 1996) and not to prepare them for high-skilled and
productive jobs. While the first set of external factors may be accounted for (within
accompanying health and nutrition aid programs), the second set is much trickier as it
may lead to face the opposition of the ruling autocracies.
The link between education and democratization, as exemplified in our Lipsetian
theory, may lead to ask more philosophical and ethical questions about the ultimate
targets of education policies: if education aid policies (ideally targeting quality and
not only access to school) can fuel democratization, then aid polices can be used as an
ideological tool to westernize the world. This raises a series of ethical questions that go
6In certain cases, policies favoring access to education have led to worsen the school quality as
in the case of the implementation of free primary education in Kenya in 2003 as reported in a 2005
UNESCO report.
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much beyond the scope of this paper (see Tabulawa, 2003, for a discussion). We shall
only observe that if the ultimate objective is democratization (that’s equal access to
political and economic rights for all the individuals in the same country), then acting on
autocracies via education is probably more ethical than encouraging coups and killings.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a Lipsetian theory of institutional change. The key mechanism
at play is the feedback effect of education policies on the awareness of workers, measur-
ing their understanding of the political system, their political sophistication, and, more
in general, their reluctance to accept a dictatorship. Human capital makes national
industry more productive and is the engine of economic growth, but has a political
cost in terms of the larger services/transfers that workers require to be refrained from
revolting. The main result of the paper is to show that two possible regimes can arise,
depending on the relative magnitude of the education incentives. The first case is that
of countries where the ruling elite support a permanent dictatorship characterized by
low (no) education, low growth, low level of worker’s life conditions. The second case
is that of countries where the elite favor long-term economic interests by investing in
education and human capital accumulation, achieve a high growth path and improving
life conditions; the cost of this development is an unavoidable removal of dictatorship
at finite time.
Our theory is compatible with Lipset in the three essential dimensions: the positive
link between human capital and institutional change, the positive link between income
and institutional change and, in a more stylized fashion, the negative link between
inequality and institutional change. It also gives new insights on the “resource curse”
hypothesis. The –largely empirical– debate whether or not resource wealth impedes
democracy is still undecided. Our analysis explains the mixed support for the resource
curse. Resource wealth may promote the transition from autocratic regimes to democ-
racies, but only if combined with other crucial ingredients, such as the quality of the
education sector and of the institutional system. When these conditions are met, we
also highlight that the higher the windfalls the sooner the transition. Our theory finally
has some implications in terms of aid programs intended to promote development. Mas-
sive education support is a good candidate to trigger the process of sustained growth of
human capital and, as a side-product, democratization. However, its effectiveness re-
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quires development programs be directed to the improvement of the education system,
that has many determinants beside the quality of teaching and school infrastructure.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
A.1.1 Item (i)
When regime 1 is permanent, from the transversality condition we must have:
C10 =
ρ− χ(1− γ)
γh
(
H0 +
h(pxR− s)
χ
)
So existence requires ρ > χ(1 − γ). More generally, the ordering between χ and ρ is
crucial to discuss the nature of any potential solution. First assume that ρ > χ. Then,
from the expression of the stock of human capital
H1(t) =
γhC10
ρ− χ(1− γ)e
(χ−ρ)t
γ − h(p
xR− s)
χ
,
we obtain that H1∞ = −h(p
xR−s)
χ
< 0, which is impossible. Thus, in this case, necessarily
the system reaches the frontier E1 = 0 in finite time. Next, consider the alternative,
χ(1 − γ) < ρ < χ (ρ = χ is a knife-edge situation). In this case, both consumption
and human capital are varying at the constant rate (χ− ρ)/γ. Hereafter we disregard
this case because either it is not compatible with the resource constraint or, if resource
imports are allowed, it implies that X1 → −∞, which is not a reasonable feature of the
model.
A.1.2 Item (ii)
From the second optimality condition 12, for the stopping time T , we have:
C10 = (hpi)
− 1
γ e−
(χ−ρ)T
γ .
Substituting the expression in (13), we obtain:
C1 (t) = (hpi)−
1
γ e
1
γ
(χ−ρ)(t−T )
H1 (t) = ϕ (T ) eχt + γh(hpi)
− 1γ
ρ−χ(1−γ)e
(χ−ρ)(t−T )
γ − h(pxR−s)
χ
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where ϕ (T ) ≡
(
H0 +
h(pxR−s)
χ
− γh(hpi)−
1
γ e
− (χ−ρ)Tγ
ρ−χ(1−γ)
)
. The second optimal stopping con-
dition (11) can be rewritten as:
γ(hpi)−
1−γ
γ
1− γ + hpi(p
xR− s) + χpiH1(T ) = ρpiH1(T ) (20)
where the LHS is the marginal benefit of waiting (achieving utility from consumption
C(T ) and the advantage from increasing human capital piH˙1(T )), while the LHS is the
marginal cost of waiting (delaying the scrap value). Since γ(hpi)
− 1−γγ
1−γ +hpi(p
xR− s) > 0,
χ ≥ ρ implies that LHS>RHS for each level of human capital.
When χ < ρ, the RHS increases faster than the LHS: marginal benefit is first
larger and then smaller than marginal cost. Then, we can define the optimal end-point
H1(T ) = HT as:
HT =
h
ρ− χ
(
γ(hpi)−
1
γ
1− γ + p
xR− s
)
> 0. (21)
The second order condition (SOC) for the optimal stopping problem is satisfied iff
(χ− ρ) H˙1(T ) < 0, which requires H˙1(T ) > 0.
From the continuity of the state variable, we have:
HT = ϕ (T ) e
χT +
γh (hpi)−
1
γ
ρ− χ(1− γ) −
h(pxR− s)
χ
(22)
Rearranging we obtain:
ϕ (T ) eχT =
ρh
ρ− χ
(
pxR− s
χ
+
γ2 (hpi)−
1
γ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ))
)
(23)
Let F (T ) be the LHS and G > 0 the RHS. By the monotonicity of the path {H1(t)}Tt=0
(see the next item) and the SOC, H0 ≤ HT needs to hold. Hereafter, let’s pay attention
to an interior solution, i.e. H0 < HT . This is equivalent to F (0) < G. Moreover,
F (∞) = −∞. The sign of the derivative of F (T ):
F ′(T ) = eχT
(
χH0 + h(p
xR− s)− h(hpi)− 1γ e− (χ−ρ)Tγ
)
.
For the existence of an optimal interior T for democratization, it’s first necessary
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that F ′(0) > 0, which equivalent to:
H0 > H0 =
h(hpi)−
1
γ − h(pxR− s)
χ
, (24)
and for the interval (H0, HT ) to be non-empty, we must impose:
pxR− s+ (hpi)
− 1
γ (χ− ρ(1− γ))
ρ(1− γ) > 0. (25)
This is equivalent to the SOC.
One way to tackle (and simplify) the existence issue is to make sure that the opti-
mality candidate exists for any initial level of the stock of human capital H0 ∈ [0, HT ].
Otherwise, we would have to discuss and justify the relevance of some particular in-
tervals for existence. Thus, hereafter we scrutinize the conditions under which such a
candidate exists for H0 = 0. Put H0 = 0 in all the expressions above. Then, F ′(0) > 0
simplifies to
pxR− s > (hpi)− 1γ , (26)
and under this condition the SOC is satisfied.
Next we define the value that maximizes F (T ), say T˜ , as:
T˜ =
γ
ρ− χ ln
(
pxR− s
(hpi)−
1
γ
)
, (27)
and for the existence of (at most two) T ∗ > 0 that solve(s) (23), it must hold that
F (T˜ ) > G. This condition can be restated as a condition on the parameters of the
technology and preferences. Indeed, F (T˜ ) > G⇔
(ρ− χ)2
ρ(ρ− χ(1− γ))e
γχ
ρ−χ
[
pxR− s
(hpi)−
1
γ
]2
>
pxR− s
(hpi)−
1
γ
+
γ2χ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ)) ,
which is a simple polynomial of degree 2 in p
xR−s
(hpi)
− 1γ
. Now, under (26), this ratio is larger
than 1. So, a sufficient condition for F (T˜ ) > G is:
e
γχ
ρ−χ >
ρ[(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ)) + γ2χ]
(1− γ)(ρ− χ)2 , (28)
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where both terms of the inequality above are greater than 1. A quick inspection of the
properties of the LHS and RHS of (28), seen as functions of parameter χ, reveals that
there exists a unique threshold χ ∈ (0, ρ) such that (28) holds iff χ < χ.
The reasoning above is also valid for any H0 > 0. Actually, the existence of a
solution for the particular value H0 = 0 implies that such a solution exists for any
H0 > 0. In general, the optimal stopping time can be expressed as a function H0:
T ∗ = T (H0) that satisfies, by differentiating (23):
∂T
∂H0
= − 1
χϕ (T (H0)) + ϕ′ (T (H0))
.
Given that we want ∂T
∂H0
< 0 (uniqueness of the optimal trajectory), only the solution
corresponding the increasing part of F (T ) is relevant, i.e. one has F ′(T ) > 0, which is
equivalent to:
pxR− s > e (ρ−χ)Tγ (hpi)− 1γ . (29)
Comparative statics on T ∗ that solves (23), given that this equation can be rewritten
as F (T,R, pi) = G(R, pi). By the implicit function theorem, we have:
∂T
∂R
=
∂G
∂R
− ∂F
∂R
∂F
∂T
and
∂T
∂pi
=
∂G
∂pi
− ∂F
∂pi
∂F
∂T
,
given that ∂G
∂R
− ∂F
∂R
= hp
x(ρ−1)
χ
< 0 and ∂G
∂pi
− ∂F
∂pi
= −h2(hpi)−
1
γ
ρ−χ(1−γ)(
ργ
(ρ−χ)(1−γ) + e
(ρ−χ)T
γ < 0.
Finally, since the solution satisfies ∂F
∂T
> 0 (because we want T ′(H0) < 0 for all H0 ≥ 0),
we can conclude that T ∗ is decreasing w.r.t. both R and pi.
A.1.3 Monotonicity of trajectories
The value function at any H1(ti) = Hi taken on the optimal path is given by:
V 1(Hi) = e
−ρθ(Hi)
(
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ))
[
e
(ρ−χ(1−γ))
γ
θ(Hi) − 1
]
+ piHT
)
with θ(Hi) = T (Hi)− ti, the optimal time-to-go before stopping, which doesn’t depend
on ti.
If there exists an optimal trajectory of type 1 from someH0 withH(t) non monotone,
it must be true that H is decreasing first, then increasing. This implies that there exists
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(t1, t2), with t1 < t2, such that: H1(t1) = H1(t2). Thus, we have θ(H1) = θ(H2): The
time that elapses between t1 and T (H1) must be the same as the one between t2 and
T (H2). This yields a contradiction because the optimal trajectory is uniquely defined
(HT is invariant) and (initial) consumptions at t1 and t2 necessarily differ.
Finally note that the solution with positive education and a revolution in finite time
yields the following present value to the elite:
V 1(H0) = e
−ρT (H0)
(
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ))(e
(ρ−χ(1−γ))
γ
T (H0) − 1) + piHT
)
(30)
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
A.2.1 Item (i)
If regime 2 is permanent, then from the transversality condition L = 0, and the solution
reduces to (using the superscript 2):
H2(t) = H0e
−δt
C2(t) = pxR− s+ ΩH2(t)
λ2(t) = −e(ρ+δ)t ´ t
0
ΩC(u)−γe−(ρ+δ)udu(< 0).
The value function is given by:
V 2(H0) =
ˆ ∞
0
1
1− γ
(
pxR− s+ ΩH0e−δt
)1−γ
e−ρtdt. (31)
A.2.2 Item (ii)
Consider a trajectory ({H1} , {C1}) that reaches the locus E = 0 at date t1 for some
stock H1(t1) = H˜ and consumption C1(t1) = C˜. From the dynamical system, both
H1 and C1 are all decreasing w.r.t. time. The approach is to consider a solution with
permanent E = 0 as a limit case of the solution with a regime change from E > 0 to
E = 0. Let’s work with the general solution obtained by combining regimes 1 and 2.
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For the time being, let t1 be given. Recall that the general solution in each regime is:
C1(t) = C0e
(χ−ρ)t
γ
H1(t) =
(
H0 +
h(pxR−s)
χ
− γhC0
ρ−χ(1−γ)
)
eχt + γhC0
ρ−χ(1−γ)e
(χ−ρ)t
γ − h(pxR−s)
χ
and,
H2(t) = H˜e−δ(t−t1)
C2(t) = pxR− s+ ΩH2(t)
From the continuity of consumption at t1, we obtain: C0 =
(
pxR− s+ ΩH˜
)
e−
(χ−ρ)
γ
t1
and C1(t) =
(
pxR− s+ ΩH˜
)
e
(χ−ρ)(t−t1)
γ .
From the continuity of the state variable at t1, H˜ can be expresses as a function of
t1: H˜ = ζ(t1) with:
ζ(t1) =
(ρ− χ(1− γ))
[(
H0 +
h(pxR−s)
χ
− γh(pxR−s)
ρ−χ(1−γ) e
−χ−ρ
γ
t1
)
eχt1 − h(ρ−χ)(pxR−s)
χ(ρ−χ(1−γ))
]
ρ− χ(1− γ) + γΩh
(
e
(ρ−χ(1−γ))
γ
t1 − 1
)
So the value corresponding to this trajectory can be written as:
V (t1) =
1
1−γ
[´ t1
0
(pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1))1−γ e
(1−γ)(χ−ρ)
γ
(t−t1)e−ρtdt+
+
´∞
t1
(
pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1)e−δ(t−t1)
)1−γ
e−ρtdt
]
Taking the derivative w.r.t t1 yields:
∂V
∂t1
= 1
1−γ (p
xR− s+ Ωζ(t1))1−γ e−ρt1+
+ 1
1−γ
´ t1
0
e−
(ρ−χ(1−γ)
γ
te
(1−γ)(ρ−χ)
γ
t1 (pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1))−γ [(1− γ)Ωζ ′(t1)+
+ (1−γ)(ρ−χ)
γ
(pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1))
]
−
+ 1
1−γ (p
xR− s+ Ωζ(t1))1−γ e−ρt1+
+
´∞
t1
Ω(ζ ′(t1) + δζ(t1))e−δ(t−t1)
(
pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1)e−δ(t−t1)
)−γ
e−ρtdt
Taking the limit when t1 → 0, we obtain:
lim
t1→0
∂V
∂t1
=
ˆ ∞
0
Ω(ζ ′(0) + δζ(0))
(
pxR− s+ Ωζ(t1)e−δt
)−γ
e−(δ+ρ)tdt,
and it’s clear that the sign of the limit is determined by the sign of the expression
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ζ ′(0)+δζ(0). Direct computations yield: ζ(0) = H0 and the derivative of ζ(t1) evaluated
at t1 = 0 is given by: ζ ′(0) = −δH0. Thus, we obtain ζ ′(0) + δζ(0) = 0. From multi-
stage optimal control theory (interpreting the change from E > 0 to E = 0 as a regime
switching problem), we know that a necessary condition for an immediate switch t1 = 0
is limt1→0
∂V
∂t1
≤ 0 (see Amit [6], Theorem 1). Thus trajectories of the 1-2 type are
always dominated by the ones associated with permanent E = 0.
The last eventuality is a candidate with a regime change from 2 to 1. Suppose
the economy starts in regime E = 0 and enters the region with positive education at
t1 < ∞. Then, there are two options. Either the economy stays in region 1 till the
institutional change. This would implies the crossing of the locus H˙ = 0 in finite time.
But this is excluded by the argument provided in Appendix A.1 because the trajectory
{H1(t)} must be monotonous. Or, the economy stays for a while in regime 1 before
going back in regime 2. But this is not optimal if one refers to the reasoning developed
just above. The economy prefers to directly settle on the locus E = 0 rather than to
start in regime 1 before a switch, in finite time, to regime 2.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
At solution 1 (democratization), the index of inequalities is:
I1(t) =
(sχ− φh(pxR− s))
χ
(hpi)
1
γ e
(ρ−χ)(t−T )
γ +φϕ(T )(hpi)
1
γ e
(ρ−χ(1−γ))t
γ e
(χ−ρ)T
γ +
φγh
ρ− χ(1− γ)
Take the derivative w.r.t time:
I˙1(t) =
(hpi)
1
γ
γ
e
(ρ−χ)(t−T )
γ
[
(ρ− χ)(sχ− φh(pxR− s)) + φ(ρ− χ(1− γ)ϕ(T )eχT ] .
The sign of the derivative is given by the sign of the term, denoted Ψ, between squared
brackets. Evaluating this coefficient at t = 0, we obtain:
Ψ = (ρ− χ)s+ φ(ρ− χ(1− γ))H0 + γφh
[
pxR− s− (hpi)− 1γ e (ρ−χ)Tγ
]
,
which is positive according to (29). Thus I˙1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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At solution 2 (permanent dictatorship), the index is simply given by:
I2(t) =
s+ φH2(t)
pxR− s+ ΩH2(t) ,
with derivative:
I˙2(t) =
pxH˙
(pxR− s+ ΩH2(t)2
[
φR− 1− α
α
(
αA
px
) 1
1−α
s
]
.
Thus,
R >
(1− α)s
φα
(
αA
px
) 1
1−α
is sufficient to conclude that I˙2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of the first item of Proposition 4 works by contradiction and relies on a time
consistency requirement for optimal trajectories.
Let’s assume that V 1(HT ) < V 2(HT ). Regarding the ordering between the value
functions at the other boundary, two case are possible.
Case 1. Let V 1(0) < V 2(0). If the curves V 1(H0) and V 2(H0) intersect then
the number of intersections must be even. For instance, consider that there are two
intersections Hˆ and H˜, with 0 < H˜ < Hˆ < HT . By construction, we have V 1(H0) >
V 2(H0) for all H0 ∈ (H˜, Hˆ), V 1(H0) < V 2(H0) for all H0 ∈ [0, H˜) ∪ (Hˆ,HT ], V 1(H˜) =
V 2(H˜) and V 1(Hˆ) = V 2(Hˆ).
At H0 = Hˆ, there exist two optima, i.e. the elite are indifferent between following
path 1 (with positive education) or path 2 (no education). If the economy settles on path
1, then from what has been establish in Appendix A.1, human capital increases. But
by construction again, for any H varying in (Hˆ,HT ], V 1(H) < V 2(H): The elite would
prefer to follow path 2 rather than path 1, which implies that the solution considered
is not time consistent. This yields a contradiction. If the elite chooses path 2, then
from Appendix A.2, human capital decreases monotonically. But V 1(H) > V 2(H) for
all H ∈ (H˜, Hˆ). There is a non degenerate period of time during which the elite would
prefer in fact being in regime 1. Based on the time consistency requirement, we obtain
a contradiction.
Case 2. Let V 1(0) > V 2(0). This implies that the number of intersections between
33
V 1(H0) and V 2(H0) (if any) is odd. Let’s work with a unique intersection at Hˇ that is
such that V 1(H0) > V 2(H0) for all H0 ∈ [0, Hˇ), V 1(H0) < V 2(H0) for all H0 ∈ (Hˇ,HT ]
and V 1(Hˇ) = V 2(Hˇ).
At H0 = Hˇ, there is multiplicity of optima. Either, the elite may adopt the regime
with positive education and human capital increases. Again by construction, we have
V 1(H) < V 2(H) for all H ∈ (Hˇ,HT ], which yields a contradiction. Or, they may
choose not to invest in education, in which case H decreases and a contradiction arises
too.
Proofs of the remaining items are left to the reader since they exactly follow the
same line. In particular the reasoning of the second item is symmetric when one
works with V 1(0) > V 2(0). As for the third item, assuming that V 1(0) ≤ V 2(0)
and V 1(HT ) ≥ V 2(HT ) (with one strict inequality), it’s easy to show that there exists a
unique intersection between the two value functions, for a critical initial stock of human
capital H¯ such that V 1(H0) R V 2(H0)⇔ H0 R H¯.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
For the sake of exposition, let T (0) be denoted by T . Then, V 1(0) > V 2(0) if and only
if:
e−ρT
(
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
(1− γ)(ρ− χ(1− γ))
[
e
(ρ−χ(1−γ))
γ
T − 1
]
+ piHT
)
>
(pxR− s)1−γ
ρ(1− γ) ;
which, by the definition of HT in (21) and by (23), yields:
(pxR− s)1−γ
ρ(1− γ) <
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
ρ(1− γ) e
(ρ−χ)(1−γ)
γ
T +
hpi(pxR− s)
ρ
e(χ−ρ)T . (32)
Denote the RHS of (32) by J(T ). It follows that J(0) = hpi
ρ
(
γ
1−γ (hpi)
− 1
γ + pxR− s
)
> 0,
limT→∞ J(T ) =∞ and:
J ′(T ) =
hpi(ρ− χ)
ρ
e(χ−ρ)T
[
(hpi)−
1
γ e
(ρ−χ)T
γ − (pxR− s)
]
.
We observe that J ′(T ) 5 0⇔ T 5 T˜ , where T˜ has been defined in (27). Thus, imposing
J(T˜ ) > (p
xR−s)1−γ
ρ(1−γ) , which is equivalent to:
pxR− s > e γ1+γ (hpi)− 1γ , (33)
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is sufficient to conclude that V 1(0) > V 2(0).
Moreover, whatever the regime, the value functions are strictly increasing in H0,
it’s clear that a sufficient condition for having V 2(H0) > V 1(H0) for all H0 ∈ [0, HT ] is
V 2(0) ≥ V 1(HT ), which is equivalent to:
(pxR− s)1−γ
ρ(1− γ) ≥ piHT ⇔
(pxR− s)1−γ
ρ(1− γ) ≥
γ(hpi)−
(1−γ)
γ
(ρ− χ)(1− γ) +
pih(pxR− s)
ρ− χ . (34)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
For any H0 ∈ [0, HT ], regime 1’s value function (30) can be rewritten as:
V 1(H0) =
pie−(ρ−χ)T (H0)
ρ
(
hγ(hpi)−
1
γ
1− γ e
(ρ−χ)
γ
T (H0) + χH0 + h(p
xR− s)
)
,
denote this function by W 1(T (H0)), with W 1′ < 0 and define:
T˜ (H0) =
γ
ρ− χ ln
(
χH0 + h(p
xR− s)
h(hpi)−
1
γ
)
,
this generalizes (27) for any H0 ∈ [0, HT ]. From Appendix A.1, we know that T (H0) ∈
(0, T˜ (H0))⇔ W 1(T (H0)) > W 1(T˜ (H0)) for all H0, with:
W 1(T˜ (H0)) =
pie−γ
ρ(1− γ)h(hpi)− 1γ
(χH0 + h(p
xR− s))2,
denote this lower bound as W 1(H0). We have W 1(0) = (hpi)
1+γ
γ e−γ
ρ(1−γ) (p
xR − s)2 and
W 1′(H0),W 1′′(H0) > 0.
Now, note that for any H0 ∈ [0, HT ], regime 2’s value function (31) is bounded from
above by a function W 2(H0) defined as follows:
W
2
(H0) =
(pxR− s+ ΩH0)1−γ
ρ(1− γ) ,
with W 2(0) = (p
xR−s)1−γ
ρ(1−γ) , W
2′
(H0) > 0 and W
2′′
(H0) < 0.
Suppose that condition (18) of Proposition 5, item (i), doesn’t hold. This is equiv-
alent to W 2(0) ≥ W 1(0). Given that limH0→∞ W
2
(H0)
W 1(H0)
= 0, we can conclude that
there exists a critical level of human capital H0 ∈ (0, HT ) such that for all H0 ≥ H0,
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W 1(H0) ≥ W 2(H0) if and only if:
W
2
(HT ) < W
1(HT ),
with HT defined by (21).
This condition implies that V 1(H0) > V 2(H0) for all H0 ≥ H0, i.e., the path with
democratization is optimal for a high enough resource stock. This condition is not
easily interpretable since it depends on an endogenous variable HT . This condition can
however be rewritten in terms of the parameters when assuming that δ = 0. In this
case, it reduces to:
pxR− s > (hpi)
− 1
γ
ρ(1− γ)((ρ− χ)(1− γ)e
γ
1+γ − χγ).
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